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We give a concise presentation of the Univalent Foundations of mathematics outlining
the main ideas (section 1), followed by a discussion of the large-scale UniMath library of
formalized mathematics implementing the ideas of the Univalent Foundations, and the
challenges one faces in designing such a library (section 2). This leads us to a general
discussion about the links between architecture and mathematics where a meeting of
minds is revealed between architects and mathematicians (section 3). Last, we show
how the Univalent Foundations enforces a structuralist view of mathematics embodied
in the so-called Structure Identity Principle (section 4). On the way our odyssey from
the foundations to the “horizon” of mathematics will lead us to meet the mathematicians
David Hilbert and Nicolas Bourbaki as well as the architect Christopher Alexander and
the philosopher Paul Benacerraf.
1 The Univalent Foundations of Mathematics
The Univalent Foundations [1] of mathematics designed by Vladimir Voevodsky builds
upon Martin-Löf type theory[2], a logical system for constructive mathematics with
nice computational properties that makes mathematics amenable to proof-checking by
computers (i.e. by a piece of software called a proof assistant). Certified or type-checked
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proofs should not be mistaken for automated proofs. Even if proof assistants come with
various levels of automation, either built-in for elementary steps or user-defined via the
so-called tactics for less basic steps, the proof assistant only checks that man-made proofs
written with it are correct.
1.1 The Univalence Axiom
The main characters in Martin-Löf type theory (MLTT for short) are types and elements
of these types. If T is a type, then the expression t : T denotes that t is an element of
T . In particular, if T is a type and t, t′ are elements of T there is a new type called the
identity type of t and t′ denoted t =T t′. Sometimes for convenience we will omit the type
information and we will simply write t = t′. When one considers only a single element t,
i.e. t′ is definitionaly equal to t, the identity type t =T t has always at least one element
denoted idpath t, i.e. the expression idpath t : t =T t is well-formed. This term idpath
is called a constructor and the identity types belong to a particular class of types called
inductive types. Indeed, besides their constructors (an inductive type can have either a
single constructor or many constructors), a family of types defined inductively (like the
identity types are when introduced formally) obey an induction principle. In the case
of identity types, this induction principle states that given a type T , an element t : T , a
family F of types indexed by an element t0 : T and an element p0 : t =T t0, if there is an
element f : F t (idpath t) (the family F instantiated with the terms t and idpath t), then
for any elements t′ : T , p : t =T t′ there is an element of the type F t′ p, and moreover this
element is f itself when t′ and p are definitionaly equal to t and idpath t, respectively. Of
course, one can iterate the process of building identity types, namely given p and q two
elements of the identity type t =T t′, one can form the identity type p =t=T t′ q and so
on. As it happens, these identity types lead to a very rich mathematical structure and
there is a surprising connection between homotopy theory and MLTT (the latter being
also coined Martin-Löf dependent type theory in reference to these dependent types, i.e.
dependent on previous types for their definition which may be inductive, like in the case
of identity types, or not). Roughly, one can think of T as a space, two elements t and
t′ of T as points of this space, two elements p and q of the type t =T t′ as paths from
t to t′ in the space T , and the elements of p =t=T t′ q as homotopies between the paths
p and q and so on (the elements of the successive iterated identity types being higher
homotopies). Under this correspondence idpath t is the identity path between a point
t and itself in the given space. Each type bearing the structure of a weak ∞-groupoid
obtained from the tower of iterated identity types over that type. Moreover, when given
two types A and B, there is also a new type denoted A → B for the type of functions
between A and B. Among these functions some of them have a distinctive property,
namely their (homotopy) fibers are contractible3, and they are called weak equivalences.
Again, one forms a new type for the weak equivalences between two types A and B
denoted A ' B. Voevodsky found an interpretation of the rules of MLTT using Kan
3The fundamental concept of contractibility is defined later in 1.2
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simplicial sets where an additional axiom, the so-called Univalence Axiom, is satisfied.
The Univalence Axiom (UA for short) states a property of a universe U (interpreted as
the base of a universal Kan fibration), itself a type whose elements are themselves types
called “small” types. More specifically, first note that given two small types A and B, by
applying the induction principle of identity types (take T := U , t := A, and the family
F such that F B p0 is A ' B in the statement of the induction principle above) one
defines a function eqweqmap from A =U B to A ' B that maps the identity path to the
identity equivalence when B is definitionally equal to A. The Univalence Axiom states
that for any two small types A and B the above function from A =U B to A ' B is
a weak equivalence, giving the correct notion of equality (or path under the connection
alluded to above) in the universe.
1.2 The homotopy levels
Note that in the function type A → B introduced above the type B does not depend
on the type A. Now, we can replace the type B by a family of (small) types indexed
by the type A, namely an element F of type A → U (where U is a universe), in
this case we get a new type, the cartesian product of the family of types F , denoted∏
x:A
F x. Given two elements f, g :
∏
x:A
F x, we could also ask if there is an equivalence
between the identity type f = g and the dependent product
∏
x:A
(f(x) = g(x)). This
equivalence (or rather the non-obvious implication) is known as function extensionality
and it does not hold in MLTT. Fortunately, UA does imply function extensionality, i.e.
given A : U , F : A → U and f, g :
∏
x:A
F x, using UA one produces a term of the type
(
∏
x:A
f(x) = g(x)) ' (f = g). Thus, the Univalence Axiom can be seen as a strong
form of extensionality and the Univalent Foundations are a powerful and elegant way to
achieve extensional concepts in Martin-Löf dependent type theory.
Without surprise another very important type is the type of natural numbers denoted
nat. This is a second example of an inductive type. The type nat has two constructors,
0 of type nat and s of type nat → nat that corresponds to the successor function. The
induction principle of nat is what one expects, namely an element of the type∏
P :nat→U
P 0→ (
∏
n:nat
P n→ P (s n))→ (
∏
n:nat
P n) .
Finally, we would like to introduce an additional dependent type called the dependent
sum type. Given a type A and an element B : A → U , we form the type of dependent
pairs (x, y) with x : A and y : B x denoted
∑
x:A
B x. Given a small type A, the type A
might have the property that it has an element cntr : A together with for every element
x : A a path from x to cntr, i.e. an element of
∏
x:A
x =A cntr. The dependent sum
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allows us to form the type of such elements, namely
∑
cntr:A
∏
x:A
(x =A cntr) shortened to
iscontrA, that corresponds to the type of proofs that A seen as a space is contractible.
If this last type is inhabited, ie if it has an element, the type A is said to be contractible
and cntr is called a center of contraction. We are now equipped with all the tools we
need to introduce the very important concept of homotopy levels, the so-called h-levels,
that intuitively capture the fact that at some point in the tower connected with a type
the iterated identity types might be contractible. First, we need to know that one is
allowed to define functions over inductive types, in particular over the type of natural
numbers nat. Hence, we will define an element denoted isofhlevel of type nat→ U → U .
To achieve this, it is enough to define isofhlevel 0X to be iscontrX and isofhlevel (s n)X
to be
∏
x:X
∏
y:X
isofhleveln (x =X y), where X is a small type. Given a small type X and
a natural number n, if the type isofhlevelnX is inhabited, then one says that X is of
h-level n. The type of all types of h-level n is
∑
X:U
isofhlevelnX 4. The types of h-level
1 are called propositions, they are the types in which any two elements are equal. The
types of h-level 2 are called sets. For n ≥ 3 the types of h-level n are higher analogs
of sets. It is possible to prove for instance that given a type X and an element n : nat
the type isofhlevelnX is a proposition, that the type nat is a set, or that the type∑
X:U
isofhlevelnX is of h-level n+1. Moreover, the Univalence Axiom is consistent with
respect to the Law of Excluded Middle for propositions and the Axiom of Choice for sets,
hence not diminishing our ability to reason about propositions or sets but increasing our
ability to work with higher analogs of sets.
Informed by homotopy theory, the main merits of the Univalent Foundations are the
realization that types in MLTT are interpreted by homotopy types (topological spaces
up to weak homotopy equivalences), their corresponding stratification according to the
h-levels, and the ability that types give us to build (weak) higher groupoids through
the tower of their iterated identity types. Moreover, the Univalence Axiom gives us the
ability to reason formally about structures on these higher groupoids by enforcing an
equivalence principle that makes two equivalent types indistinguishable in the Univalent
Foundations. Indeed, let U0, U1 be two universes with U0 : U1 and U0 being univalent.
Given any family P : X → U1, there exists two terms transportfP : (x =X y) → Px →
Py and transportbP : (x =X y) → Py → Px. In particular, if one takes U0 for X, then
using the univalence axiom for U0 one derives two terms of types (A ' B)→ PA→ PB
and (A ' B)→ PB → PA, respectively.
The Univalent Foundations realizes the following vision of Voevodsky :
First note that we can stratify mathematical constructions by their “level”.
There is element-level mathematics - the study of element-level objects such
as numbers, polynomials or various series. Then one has set level mathemat-
ics - the study of sets with structures such as groups, rings etc. which are
4This type is small with respect to a higher universe. This technical detail is unimportant for people
unfamiliar with type theory.
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invariant under isomorphisms. The next level is traditionally called category-
level, but this is misleading. A collection of set-level objects naturally forms
a groupoid since only isomorphisms are intrinsic to the objects one considers,
while more general morphisms can often be defined in a variety of ways. Thus
the next level after the set-level is the groupoid-level - the study of properties
of groupoids with structures which are invariant under the equivalences of
groupoids. From this perspective a category is an example of a groupoid with
structure which is rather similar to a partial ordering on a set. Extending
this stratification we may further consider 2-groupoids with structures, n-
groupoids with structures and ∞-groupoids with structures. Thus a proper
language for formalization of mathematics should allow one to directly build
and study groupoids of various levels and structures on them. A major ad-
vantage of this point of view is that unlike∞-categories, which can be defined
in many substantially different ways the world of∞-groupoids is determined
by Grothendieck correspondence, which asserts that ∞-groupoids are “the
same” as homotopy types. Combining this correspondence with the previous
considerations we come to the view that not only homotopy theory but the
whole of mathematics is the study of structures on homotopy types.[3].
2 The UniMath library
2.1 A large-scale library of formalized mathematics
Nowadays the community working on the Univalent Foundations is not only involved in
the design of new foundations for mathematics, but also in the design of a large-scale
mathematical library, the UniMath [4] project, using the Coq proof assistant.
The stratification of types according to their h-levels discriminates well behaved propo-
sitions and sets, hence it allows surprisingly convenient and elegant formalizations of
mathematics at the levels of sets and categories with a proof assistant. There is an ana-
log of the univalence property for categories that mimics the pattern described at the end
of the subsection 1.1 for the Univalence Axiom. Indeed, given a category C and two ele-
ments a and b of ob C, the type of objects of C, one defines by induction a function idtoiso
from a =C b to the type iso a b of isomorphisms from a to b that maps the identity path
to the identity morphism when b is definitionaly equal to a. The category C is univalent
if for any two elements a, b : ob C the above function is a weak equivalence. As a conse-
quence, in the Univalent Foundations all category-theoretic constructions and proofs are
invariant under isomorphism of objects of a univalent category and under equivalence of
univalent categories. Using the Univalence Axiom one proves that the category of sets is
univalent as well as many categories of structured sets (monoids, groups, rings, modules,
discrete fields). For the formalizations of these categories see the “CategoryTheory” file
of the UniMath[4] library. Moreover, any category is equivalent to a univalent category
called its Rezk completion (note that the univalence property itself for categories is not
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invariant under equivalence of categories, only under isomorphism of categories).
2.2 Higher inductive types and the realm of homotopy groups of
spheres
One can also note the introduction of new features like higher inductive types5 that
greatly ease the formalization of algebraic topology for instance, making possible the re-
discovery in these new foundations of the realm of homotopy groups of spheres. Roughly,
the idea of higher inductive types being that unlike ordinary inductive types we allow in
their definitions not only constructors that generate elements of the type being defined,
but also constructors that generate paths (i.e. elements of identity types) or even higher
homotopies.
2.3 Toward massive collaborations in mathematics
The Univalent Foundations lead to a high level of certification and collaboration in
mathematics using the Coq proof assistant for the former and the open source distributed
revision control system Git, the development platform GitHub and a Google Group
“Univalent Mathematics”[5] for the latter. Note that certification is a prerequisite for
true massive collaboration in mathematics that is otherwise hardly possible, since one
would need to check by hand developments by others in order to rely on them for
his own proofs and developments. The advantage of certification allows the UniMath
developers to focus on the quality and human-readability of theorems and proofs in the
library. Usually, when someone submits a contribution then volunteers make remarks
and suggestions to improve the formalization, sometimes several rounds of rewriting are
undertaken.
So far, mathematicians have blamed the formalization of mathematics for its tediousness.
Regarding an influential old formal language called Automath, N.G. de Bruijn wrote in
“A survey of the project Automath”[6] :
A very important thing that can be concluded from all writing experiments
is the constancy of the loss factor. The loss factor expresses what we loose
in shortness when translating very meticulous "ordinary" mathematics into
Automath. This factor may be quite big, something like 10 or 20, but it is
constant : it does not increase if we go further in the book. It would not be
too hard to push the constant factor down by efficient abbreviations.
So, de Bruijn notes two things. First, formal proofs are longer, sometimes to an inad-
missible point, as measured by the loss factor. Second, the loss factor is constant and
it does not increase beyond some threshold. Regarding the first point, Freek Wiedijk in
5The UniMath library does not allow higher inductive types. However, we choose to mention them
since they have played an important role in the development of Homotopy Type Theory (see for
instance the chapters 6 and 8 of [23]) and they are used in many other libraries.
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[7]6 gives interesting data for the AutoMath, Mizar, and HOL Light systems. In several
cases, what Wiedijk calls the de Bruijn Factor, roughly the ratio of a formalized text
to a TEX encoding of its informal counterpart, is around 4. It would be interesting to
have similar data for Isabelle, a system with more automation, and for a more expres-
sive system based on a dependent type theory like Coq, these systems might compare
favourably. A de Bruijn factor equal or less than 2 might be more acceptable to a
mathematician, and it is certainly a goal one should strive for. In order to succeed, in
addition to more efficient support for notations as pointed out by de Bruijn, we cer-
tainly need more automation to handle the most obvious and boring parts of formal
proofs. In the meantime, given enough hands and eyeballs can any substantial formal-
ization effort be made shallow enough ? I believe that the formalization of well-known
mathematics, at the undergraduate or even graduate level, is parallelizable and could
benefit from a divide-and-conquer approach to build comprehensive libraries that the
working mathematician could use to do research-level mathematics. In this perspective,
the formalization of mathematics might be more suited to massive collaborations than
a project that focuses exclusively on research-level open problems like the Polymath
Project7.
2.4 The challenge of scalability
With large-scale formalized mathematics one faces the challenge of scalability. As sug-
gested by the second point of de Bruijn, the constancy of the loss factor, the problem is
not so much about the increase of de Bruijn factor with the length of a text, but about
other aspects whose scalability might be problematic. I will give a simple example. With
the growth of the library, its index for search becomes huge. If there is no homogeneity
when possible for the names of the definitions, lemmas and theorems, then it becomes
very difficult for the user to check whether some item useful for his goal has already been
formalized and if so to find it in the library, for instance by guessing easily its name. One
could hope that the tools of machine learning could offer in the near future for instance
more intelligent search support for definitions, lemmas and theorems in libraries as well
as some other useful automated tools. But this perspective should not prevent us from
being very careful with the design of our library to achieve something whole.
2.5 The foundations : a never-ending work or an horizon
We think that in this beginning 21st century something new of the same magnitude as
the Bourbaki project could wait for us mathematicians. However, Bourbaki told us the
following :
If formalized mathematics were as simple as the game of chess, then once
our chosen formalized language had been described there would remain only
6See also http://www.cs.ru.nl/~freek/factor/
7https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polymath_Project
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the task of writing out our proofs in this language, just as the author of a
chess manual writes down in his notation the games he proposes to teach,
accompanied by commentaries as necessary. But the matter is far from being
as simple as that, and no great experience is necessary to perceive that such
a project is absolutely unrealizable : the tiniest proof at the beginning of
the Theory of Sets would already require several hundreds of signs for its
complete formalization. Hence, from Book I of this series onwards, it is
imperative to condense the formalized text by the introduction of a fairly
large number of new words (called abbreviating symbols) and additional
rules of syntax (called deductive criteria). By doing this we obtain languages
which are much more manageable than the formalized language in its strict
sense. Any mathematician will agree that these condensed languages can
be considered as merely shorthand transcriptions of the original formalized
language. But we no longer have the certainty that the passage from one
of these languages to another can be made in a purely mechanical fashion :
for to achieve this certainty it would be necessary to complicate the rules
of syntax which govern the use of the new rules to such a point that their
usefulness became illusory; just as in algebraic calculation and in almost all
forms of notation commonly used by mathematicians, a workable instrument
is preferable to one which is theoretically more perfect but in practice far
more cumbersome. ([8], Introduction, p. 10).
As it happens, the end of the 20th century gave us such unforeseen powerful theories and
proof assistants, actually not so “complicated” as anticipated by Bourbaki, for instance
under the form of the so-called Calculus of Inductive Constructions (a dependent type
theory extended with various features) as embodied in Coq, equipped with notational
support to handle notations even including LaTeX and unicode characters, incorporating
automatic tools like tactics, and being able to automatically generate typeset documents.
Contrary to Bourbaki’s expectations, packaged this way these theories have rendered
the formalization of mathematics feasible. It opens new possibilities for learning and
teaching mathematics8, doing mathematical research, or using mathematics in industry.
Thus, time may be ripe for Bourbaki’s abandoned dream. However, one should keep in
mind the distinction between the formalization of mathematics using proof assistants
and some ultimate foundations of mathematics. We advocate only the former, since
the foundations of mathematics may be a never-ending work, what Bourbaki called
the “horizon”[9]. Hence, the importance of a second technical challenge, the migration
of libraries, for instance from a system to a more evolved system and this is why the
UniMath library uses for its development only a small subset of the Coq language. Given
the numerous proof assistants and libraries of formalized mathematics on the market,
migration is an important issue and old code for new proof assistants shoud be reused as
8I believe that the key step towards the widespread use of formalized mathematics is to start teaching
mathematics with the help of proof assistants, not to try very hard to gain the support of the
working mathematicians. Given that present-day students are the mathematicians of tomorrow, the
latter could be a consequence of the former.
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easily as possible to become the scaffolding for new achievements. The UniMath library
is intended to be a whole scalable migration-friendly library of formalized mathematics
with certified proofs. With respect to large-scale formalization, one very interesting
aspect of Bourbaki’s project consists in noticing that even though its members were
doing “informal” mathematics, they faced large-scale architectural problems well before
us. Hence, with this respect we can learn from Bourbaki, and Armand Borel’s article
“Twenty-Five Years with Nicolas Bourbaki 1949-1973”[10] and Pierre Cartier’s article
“The Continuing Silence of Bourbaki”[11] are informative.
3 Architecture and Mathematics
Alexander Grothendieck was a third-generation member of Bourbaki and when read-
ing Grothendieck’s “Récoltes et Semailles”[12] one can wonder why the architectural
metaphor is recurrent 9. Actually, there is a meeting of minds between great architects
and great mathematicians linked by an abstract approach of space with surprisingly at
the same time a feeling of its organic life. This abstract approach of space is remark-
able in the great architectural theoreticians, like for instance Frank Lloyd Wright, Le
Corbusier, or Christopher Alexander, in the sense that one can naively believe their
prime business is the 3-dimensional space embodied in a house, a building or a city, it is
certainly true but it goes beyond. We notice that architects have been facing large-scale
problems for long, they have been challenging them and they have offered their thoughts.
Christopher Alexander in “The Nature of Order”[13] develops what he calls wholeness
to answer these challenges. Wholeness is precisely what is lacking in most libraries of
9I will give a few examples : “Je me sens faire partie, quant à moi, de la lignée des mathématiciens dont
la vocation spontanée et la joie est de construire sans cesse des maisons nouvelles. Chemin faisant,
ils ne peuvent s’empêcher d’inventer aussi et de façonner au fur et à mesure tous les outils, ustensiles,
meubles et instruments requis, tant pour construire la maison depuis les fondations jusqu’au faîte,
que pour pourvoir en abondance les futures cuisines et les futurs ateliers, et installer la maison
pour y vivre et y être à l’aise. Pourtant, une fois tout posé jusqu’au dernier chêneau et au dernier
tabouret, c’est rare que l’ouvrier s’attarde longuement dans ces lieux, où chaque pierre et chaque
chevron porte la trace de la main qui l’a travaillé et posé. Sa place n’est pas dans la quiétude des
univers tout faits, si accueillants et si harmonieux soient-ils - qu’ils aient été agencés par ses propres
mains, ou par ceux de ses devanciers. D’autres tâches déjà l’appelant sur de nouveaux chantiers,
sous la poussée impérieuse de besoins qu’il est peut-être le seul à sentir clairement, ou (plus souvent
encore) en devançant des besoins qu’il est le seul a pressentir.” ([12], 2.5 Les héritiers et le bâtisseur);
and “Comme le lecteur l’aura sans doute deviné, ces "théories", "construites de toutes pièces", ne
sont autres aussi que ces "belles maisons" dont il a été question précédemment : celles dont nous
héritons de nos devanciers et celles que nous sommes amenés à bâtir de nos propres mains, à l’appel
et à l’écoute des choses. Et si j’ai parlé tantôt de l’ "inventivité" (ou de l’imagination) du bâtisseur
ou du forgeron, il me faudrait ajouter que ce qui en fait l’âme et le nerf secret, ce n’est nullement la
superbe de celui qui dit : "je veux ceci, et pas cela !" et qui se complaît à décider à sa guise ; tel un
piètre architecte qui aurait ses plans tout prêts en tête, avant d’avoir vu et senti un terrain, et d’en
avoir sondé les possibilités et les exigences.” ([12], 2.9); and again “C’était peut-être là la principale
raison pour laquelle les maisons que je prenais plaisir à construire sont restées inhabitées pendant
le longues années, sauf par l’ouvrier maçon lui-même (qui était en même temps aussi l’architecte, le
charpentier etc.).” ([12], 18.2.8.3 Note 135).
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formalized mathematics despite the fact it is an important feature of mathematics. Note
that wholeness in Alexander’s work is a specific concept defined by 15 properties10 ! We
will not discuss here each of those properties, but only a few that seem more relevant
with respect to mathematics, since it will be probably hopeless to search for a precise
dictionary between Alexander’s properties and some corresponding features of math-
ematics. These properties are an interesting attempt to capture what “organic” and
“life” could mean for man-made artefacts like architectural works which are Alexander’s
main concern. In his 1900 address to mathematicians “Mathematical Problems” Hilbert
mentioned this organic feature of mathematics in the following perceptive insights :
The problems mentioned are merely samples of problems, yet they will suf-
fice to show how rich, how manifold and how extensive the mathematical
science of today is, and the question is urged upon us whether mathematics
is doomed to the fate of those other sciences that have split up into separate
branches, whose representatives scarcely understand one another and whose
connection becomes ever more loose. I do not believe this nor wish it. Math-
ematical science is in my opinion an indivisible whole, an organism whose
vitality is conditioned upon the connection of its parts. [. . . ] We also notice
that, the farther a mathematical theory is developed, the more harmoniously
and uniformly does its construction proceed, and unsuspected relations are
disclosed between hitherto separate branches of the science. So it happens
that, with the extension of mathematics, its organic character is not lost but
only manifests itself the more clearly.[14].
If wholeness is a feature of mathematical science according to Hilbert, Alexander regrets
its absence in most of modern, dead and dull, architectural works while this property is
shining in some of the great artistic works of the past. Alexander’s concerns may not
be widely shared by present-day architects, but they are not without resonances among
other great architects as testified by the organic architecture of Frank Lloyd Wright or
Tadao Ando’s obsession with making light vibrant, alive, through the use of concrete. If
Alexander does not mention mathematics, a mathematician cannot help but think that
mathematical entities and mathematics as a whole (“ la mathématique” of Bourbaki,
using a singular on purpose) display to a great extent this pervasive organic character,
a life of their own, a wholeness.
Mathematical entities are like the centers of Alexander, the elementary components of
any system that make it alive, but with the subtlety that a center cannot be isolated
from other centers but needs to be understood in a mutual recursive relation with other
centers ([13], p.116). We can think about prime numbers in terms of what Alexander
calls strong centers ([13], p.151), centers that focus our attention and engage us, the
set of primes numbers being described by Alain Connes as the heart of mathematics
[15] (compare Connes’s vivid organic metaphor in the interview with the dull mechanic
metaphor of the interviewers using a coffee machine).
101. Levels of scale 2. Strong centers 3. Boundaries 4. Alternating repetition 5. Positive space 6. Good
shape 7. Local symmetries 8. Deep interlock and ambiguity 9. Contrast 10. Gradients 11. Roughness
12. Echoes 13. The void 14. Simplicity and inner calm 15. Not-separateness
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In mathematics strong centers are not only displayed as specific mathematical entities
but also in proofs, proving being at the core of the activity of the working mathematician.
Indeed, any good mathematical proof has its own architecture. This architecture revolves
around the main ideas that provide the flesh of the proof. In a given proof there are
as many strong centers as there are main ideas, fitting together thanks to boundaries
which are the glue of the inner workings of the mathematical mind, the hypotheses and
the conclusion being the initial boundary and the last boundary, respectively. Simple
proofs have usually only one center, more elaborate proofs may have many centers, but
it does not matter, centers are always what make things click. One can define the
strong centers in a proof as the main ideas such that handed to any mathematician with
the appropriate training he will not fail to reconstruct the proof on his own. In most
proof assistants, formal proofs have no structure11. It is an important issue. This is
the case for instance in the Coq proof assistant, and as a consequence in the UniMath
library, where a formal proof is basically a sequence of tactics lacking the structure of its
informal counterpart. Even if one would not intend to read formal proofs, for instance
to get pedagogical insights, but only to get certificates of correctness from them, then
one still needs to maintain on a regular basis the code in a library to take into account
revisions that might have been proposed. Since changes pushed in a library can break
some proofs, the task of repairing broken code (and in particular broken proofs) is made
harder by the lack of structure in formal proofs that makes them barely legible.
Also, there might be some roughness in the sense of Alexander in the distribution of
prime numbers mentioned above, roughness being an elusive property :
Things which have real life always have a certain ease, a morphological rough-
ness. This is not an accidental property. It is not a residue of technically
inferior culture, or the result of hand-craft or inaccuracy. [. . . ] It is an essen-
tial feature of living things, and has deep structural causes. [. . . ] Roughness
does not seek to superimpose an arbitrary order over a design, but instead
lets the larger order be relaxed, modified according to the demands and
constraints which happen locally in different parts of a design. ([13], p.210).
Moreover, it suffices to quote Hilbert again to find traces in mathematics of other prop-
erties of Alexander like local symmetries, deep interlocking and echoes :
For with all the variety of mathematical knowledge, we are still clearly
conscious of the similarity of the logical devices, the relationship of the
ideas in mathematics as a whole and the numerous analogies in its differ-
ent departments.[14].
The libraries of formalized mathematics are annoyingly lacking echoes. Often proof
assistants miss some nice built-in features. For instance, these libraries have no counter-
part as convenient as the index of a book, the easy search function of a PDF file or the
11Some proof assistants like Isabelle have structured proofs (in the case of Isabelle thanks to an addi-
tional layer called the Isar language), but there is still a lot of room for improvement.
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table of contents of a book12, let alone clickable keywords for pop-up windows to remind
the reader about definitions.13
So far, formalized mathematics has focused only on making impossible to write faulty
proofs, in doing so it has done nothing for making proofs easier to read. Quite the con-
trary, formalized mathematics is much harder to read than everyday mathematics and
this can explain why it has encountered considerable resistance from mathematicians.
One should not forget that mathematicians spend a lot of time reading mathematics,
not only doing or writing it. Formalized mathematics has forgotten the communication
function of written mathematics, and this is a problem not only with respect to math-
ematicians but also for students, especially if one believes that teaching mathematics
with proof assistants may have pedagogical value and is a necessary milestone towards
the widespread use of formalized mathematics.14 Formalized mathematics is not respon-
sive to the reader, this strong center of the subjective experience of mathematics, that
changes across the mathematical community. In this sense, it lacks the property that
Alexander coined gradients, the adaptive result in design when conditions vary. A simple
solution should be to have expensible/collapsible parts in proofs, so that every reader,
while reading a proof, can set for himself the level of details according to his background
and ability. Hopefully, this feature would allow to hide very low-level details that make
reading formal proofs cumbersome. I am not aware of any library of formalized mathe-
matics that is really designed with the reader in mind.
Finally, could it be that the last fifteenth property of Alexander, not-separateness, the
experience of “a living whole as being at one with the world” ([13], p.230), is the “un-
reasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences” emphasized by Eugene
Wigner [18] ? 15
In the same way an architect try to realize the unfolding in space of a form through
levels of scale ([13], p.145), i.e. the property that consists in the presence of centers
at a wide range of scales, mathematicians unfold their axioms through mathemati-
cal entities and theorems. The levels of scale are apparent for instance in the defini-
tion/lemma/theorem/corollary structure of a mathematical book or article. Both archi-
tects and mathematicians are happy when this unfolding looks like the unfolding of an
organism from the seed within. The axioms of mathematics are the seeds, the labour of
mathematicians are the ground that nurtures the seeds, and the mathematical entities
and theorems are the resulting landscape with its wide open horizon. Some parts of
this landscape are jardins à la française, some others are English gardens, both with
their respective supporters. Most parts of this landscape secretly aspire to the inner
peace of Japanese gardens, natural but neither artificial nor wild. This living unfolding,
from the axioms to the theorems, is the stuff mathematical objects are made from. In
12The good practices of writing a short table of contents at the top of a file starting a new formalization
and a bibliography at the end are surprisingly not even included in the style guide (https://github.
com/UniMath/UniMath/blob/master/UniMath/README.md) of UniMath as of 6 September 2018.
13Again, the Isabelle theorem prover and its bundled editor jEdit, even if not perfect, have built a
competitive advantage with search support and clickable keywords.
14See also the footnote 8 on that point.
15I have discovered a truly remarkable answer to this question which this footer is too small to contain.
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the case of the Univalent Foundations of mathematics the unfolding of shapes, namely
types of various h-levels (a concrete example of levels of scale relevant in our context
!), what appears less directly and less smoothly in sets-based mathematics as homotopy
types, is remarkable. The enlarged notion of life, of living structures, coined wholeness
by Alexander, can help to understand in particular where the platonistic attitude of
mathematicians comes from.
As pointed out earlier, Alexander underlines the interplay of centers with the use of
boundaries([13], p.150) which separate a center from others and at the same time unite
them. For a second example, think in mathematics about the locus where two topics or
two theories meet, share some methods and that could possibly merge in the future as
a result. But Alexander seems to miss the point that sometimes the life of some parts
may be at the expense of others. This full dynamics was noted by Hilbert :
[. . . ] let me point out how thoroughly it is ingrained in mathematical science
that every real advance goes hand in hand with the invention of sharper tools
and simpler methods which at the same time assist in understanding earlier
theories and cast aside older more complicated developments. It is therefore
possible for the individual investigator, when he makes these sharper tools
and simpler methods his own, to find his way more easily in the various
branches of mathematics than is possible in any other science.[14].
The result of these sharper tools and simpler methods, won after the struggle, that ease
the orientation of mathematicians in the whole of their science is the simplicity and
inner calm put forward by Alexander, and described by him as the
quality [. . . ] which is essential to the completion of the whole. [. . . ] The
quality comes about when everything unnecessary is removed.([13], p.226).
The regular clean-up and reorganizations in mathematics mentioned by Hilbert above
might be the analog of evolution in the biological world and a condition for a renewal
of creativity, biological systems being a paradigm of wholeness. Of course, biological
evolution as understood by modern biology is a blind process, while reorganizations
are made on purpose by mathematicians and some mathematicians have the platonistic
feeling to be guided by an independent architectural principle of some kind, to discover
rather than to invent mathematical objects. One could think this prompted Darwin to
say
I have deeply regretted that I did not proceed far enough at least to under-
stand something of the great leading principles of mathematics, for men thus
endowed seem to have an extra sense.[16]
, but one could also see in this quote a reference to the complementary ability of the
mathematician, like the artist, to tap into the subconscious mind as pointed out by
Jacques Hadamard[17].
While mathematical platonism may be appealing to a mathematician, it has raised issues
among philosophers. In the next section we will see how a specific theorem provable in
the Univalent Foundations tames some of these issues.
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4 The Structure Identity Principle
With ontological considerations in mind, in particular the problematic reference (in
the sense of Frege) of mathematical objects, the philosopher Paul Benacerraf noted
with wit [19] that the sets of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF for short) are unsuited
as references for the names in the mathematical discourse, since one can discriminate
between two isomorphic sets by a well-formed formula of ZF. This argument, the so-
called Benacerraf ’s Identification Problem, could reveal a flaw even in a minimalistic
endorsement of platonism as in the statement attributed to Kronecker “God made the
integers, all else is the work of man”[20]. A mathematician might answer that “numbers
can be just what they have to” [21], but he certainly will agree that this is an upsetting
feature of ZF. However, this unpleasant feature can appear without appealing to the
membership of ZF. In category theory one can easily find a statement about categories
that is not invariant under equivalence of categories (the appropriate notion of sameness
for categories). Indeed, “The category C has exactly one object” is such a statement. To
convince yourself consider the two equivalent categories :
• • ' • .
Of course, for a working category theorist this statement that implicitly mentions equal-
ity between objects of a category is fishy, precisely because it is not invariant under
equivalence of categories. Nevertheless, one does not have a sharp syntactic criterion
in the language of category theory for separation of sense from non-sense. Even the
definition of a category [22, I.2.Categories, p.10] (as opposed to what Mac Lane calls
a arrows-only metacategory) involves equalities between objects. Moreover, the right
notion of sameness is less and less clear when one goes up in the n-dimensional ladder
and talks about higher categories.
In UF a category is defined by the following data :
• A type of objects Ob: U .
• A type of morphisms mor: Ob → Ob → hSet, where hSet denotes the type of all
small types of h-level 2, i.e. the type of sets.
The type mor means that for any pair of objects we have a set of morphisms
between them.
• A type identity :
∏
c:Ob
mor c c, for the identity morphisms.
We shorten identity(c) by 1c.
• A type compose :
∏
a,b,c:Ob
(mor a b) → (mor b c) → (mor a c), for the composition of
morphisms.
We shorten compose(a b c f g) by g ◦ f .
• Plus axioms postulating equalities of morphisms for the compositions with iden-
tity morphisms and for the associativity of composition.
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Note that the axioms postulate only equalities between morphisms, not between objects.
If in addition for any objects a, b : Ob the natural map idtoiso : (a = b)→ (iso a b) is an
equivalence, then one says that the category is univalent. One has the following theorem.
Theorem ([23, theorem 9.4.16]). If C and D are univalent categories, then one has
the following equivalence
(C = D) ' (C ' D) .
Thus, in the Univalent Foundations it is impossible to discriminate, by a statement
of the language, between two equivalent univalent categories. In the Univalent Foun-
dations mathematical reasoning is invariant under the appropriate notion of sameness.
Through the lens of categories this fact is formally expressed for algebraic structures in
the theorem called the Structure Identity Principle16. First, one needs to introduce a
notion of structure over a category C.
Definition (notion of structure, [23, Definition 9.8.1]). Let C be a category, Ob
denotes its type of objects. A notion of structure (P,H) over C consists of the following.
1 A type family P : Ob → U . For each c ∈ Ob the elements of Pc are called the
(P,H)-structures on c.
2 For each c, d : Ob and α ∈ Pc, β ∈ Pd, to each f ∈ mor(c, d) a proposition Hαβ(f).
If Hαβ(f) is true, then we say that f is a (P,H)-homomorphism from α to β.
3 For each c ∈ Ob and α ∈ Pc, Hαα(1c) is true.
4 For each c, d, e ∈ Ob and α ∈ Pc, β ∈ Pd, γ ∈ Pe, if f ∈ mor(c, d) and g ∈
mor(d, e), then we have a map Hαβ(f)→ Hβγ(g)→ Hαγ(g ◦ f).
When (P,H) is a notion of structure, for α, β ∈ Pc we define α ≤c β := Hαβ(1c). It
defines a preorder on Pc by (iii) and (iv).
Definition (standard notion of structure, [23, Definition 9.8.1]). A standard
notion of structure over a category C is a notion of structure (P,H) over C such that for
all c ∈ Ob C the preorder ≤c is a partial order.
Definition (The category of (P,H)-structures, [23, Definition 9.8.1]). Let C be
a category, Ob its type of objects and (P,H) a notion of structure over C. The category
of (P,H)-structures, denoted Str(P,H)(C), is defined as follows.
• Its type of objects is given by ∑
c:Ob
Pc .
16A general theorem that "isomorphism is equality" for a large class of algebraic structures (assuming
the Univalence Axiom) was proven by Thierry Coquand and Nils Anders Danielsson[24], and accord-
ing to [23] (see Chapter 9 Notes) the formulation of the more abstract Structure Identity Principle
is due to Peter Aczel.
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• For two objects (c, α) and (d, β) the type of morphisms between them is given by∑
f :mor(c,d)
Hαβ(f) .
One easily checks that the morphisms between two objects is a set. Moreover, the
identity morphisms and the composition are inhereted from C, and thanks to conditions
(iii) and (iv) they lift to Str(P,H)(C).
We are now able to state the so-called Structure Identity Principle (this name is a bit
misleading since it is a theorem).
Theorem (The Structure Identity Principle, [23, Theorem 9.8.2]). If C is a uni-
valent category and (P,H) is a standard notion of structure over C, then the category
Str(P,H)(C) is univalent.
Since the category of sets is univalent, one can use the Structure Identity Princi-
ple to prove that many categories of algebraic structures are univalent including the
categories of monoids, groups, rings, modules, discrete fields (cf. the file CategoryThe-
ory/categories in [4] and [25] for the univalent category of modules over a ring). Roughly,
for instance if one takes for C the category of sets, denoted SET in UniMath, and for a
given set X one takes for PX the type of group structures on X, then one proves that
the category of groups is univalent. The univalence for the category Str(P,H)(SET) of
groups implies that two isomorphic groups are equal as objects of the category of groups.
Thus, the Univalent Foundations gives a satisfying solution to Benacerraf’s Identification
Problem that has been plaguing ZF.
5 Conclusion
In this article, following Alexander’s approach, we have tried to underline a few strong
centers in the foundations of mathematics, namely the Univalent Foundations, the Uni-
Math library, the Bourbaki’s cathedral of mathematics, Benacerraf’s Identification Prob-
lem and the Structure Identity Principle, twisting some philosophical threads in a mathe-
matical landscape. However, we have only sketched the boundaries between these centers
to allow for at least some wholeness in the odyssey promised in the abstract.
Some mathematicians are afraid that formalization could disrupt their flow of work,
their inner music, and this may be indeed a real danger if one is not able to cleverly
design organic libraries to allow smooth reorganizations on a regular basis. But if we are
sensitive to the wholeness of our library this danger could be avoided. By facing new
large-scale challenges in design formalized mathematics could offer us new opportunities.
The Alhambra (close to Alexander’s heart) located in Granada (Spain), started in 889,
still stands shadowing our mortality, in the same way can the libraries of formalized
mathematics do well against time ?
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